Mamasapano, once over: TOT,
lowbatt, soaked radio, no signal

PRESIDENT Benigno S. Aquino III condoles with the family of the fallen Philippine National Police-Special Action Force (PNP-SAF) Troopers during the Necrological Service at the NCRPO Multi-Purpose Center of Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig City on Friday (January 30, 2015) | Photo by Gil Nartea / Malacañang Photo Bureau

By Julius Mariveles

ALTHOUGH POLICE Director Getulio Napeñas knew there would be fatalities in carrying out what is now revealed as ‘Oplan Exodus,’ he estimated that there would be only 10 deaths among his men.

In the end, 44 members of the Philippine National Police Special Action Force (SAF) units that were sent to accomplish the mission last January 25 in Mamasapano, Maguindanao lost their lives, along with those of 18 rebel fighters and at least five civilians.

Napeñas has since suggested that there would have been fewer deaths had the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) responded earlier to rescue the SAF troopers. But among the findings of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) formed by the PNP to look into the Mamasapano incident are two key factors that probably contributed to the delay in AFP aid.

The first is the insistence of the PNP officials who put together ‘Oplan Exodus’ to stick to “time on target” or TOT in executing the mission. In truth, resigned Police Director General Alan Purisima had mentioned the phrase several times during the Senate hearing on the tragedy, using it as an explanation why he did not inform the AFP in advance about the mission.

PRESIDENT Benigno S. Aquino III offers prayers to the remains of slain Marine Corporal Josen Mias and Sergeant Francis Jeffel Flores during the wake visit at the Fort Bonifacio Naval Station Mortuary in Taguig City on Monday afternoon (March 16, 2015). President Aquino recognized the heroism of the two marines killed in encounters with Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in Maguindanao | Photo by Benhur Arcayan / Malacañang Photo Bureau

The BOI said the application of the concept meant that information would be disclosed only to a limited number of persons “until the target is engaged.” In this case, the targets were Zhulkifli Bin Hir alias Marwan, Ahmad Akmad Batabol Usman alias Usman, and Amin Baco alias Jihad, all of whom were on the U.S. wanted list for terrorism. Only Marwan was killed in the SAF assault; Usman and Jihad remain at large.

In theory, the report said, the TOT concept is “alien” even to the Armed Forces and is against all established standard operating procedures of the Armed Forces. Within the PNP itself, the TOT concept is applicable “only to ordinary police operations” and “does not conform to the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of the PNP,” the BOI said.

But when President Benigno S. Aquino III instructed Purisima and Napeñas to coordinate with the AFP, Napeñas had replied that the operation might be compromised due to “intermarriages of some AFP personnel with local people,” noted the report. Napeñas also cited previous operations of the SAF against high-value targets that failed because they coordinated with the AFP, a view shared by Purisima and Intelligence Group chief, Senior Supt. Fernando Mendez.

THE participation of resigned PNP chief Alan Purisima violated the PNP’s chain of command, the BOI report said.

According to the report, Aquino had “remained silent” when Napeñas proposed the adoption of TOT for Oplan Exodus.

The use of TOT for the mission, however, meant that the AFP could not immediately provide support like artillery or close air support to the SAF units carrying out Exodus since these would require preparations.

It is also because of the TOT concept that the ceasefire mechanisms in the peace pact between the government and MILF were activated late – hours after the fighting between the SAF and various armed groups had already started. The BOI noted that based on the experience of the AFP, it would take at least five hours for a total ceasefire to be implemented once a gunbattle starts.

Yet one of the survivors, Supt. Raymund Train of the 84th Special Action Company, the attack unit, told the BOI that they had expected indirect artillery support from the AFP in case of heavy enemy fire.

ARTILLERY support for the SAF troopers came when 44 were already dead on January 25 | Photo from Zombie Wiki

That kind of support did indeed come – in the early evening of January 25, when most of the fighting was done and 44 of Train’s comrades were already dead.

Another crucial factor that seems to have complicated the AFP’s extension of help was the apparently inadequate communication equipment used by SAF during the mission.

Indeed, while the SAF troopers were armed with expensive rifles, night-vision googles, and other high-tech equipment on a par with elite units of advanced countries, the communication equipment most had on them were two-way radios that were not designed for military use. According to the report, these were not “compatible with AFP radios for interoperability” or could not communicate on the same radio frequency.

AN EXAMPLE of a Harris radio used by two US forces | Photo from tacrep

Worse, the radios had old batteries that could not retain power for a long period of time. “The batteries,” said the BOI, ” had poor power-retention capability due to wear and tear.” In simple terms, they went “lowbatt” quickly.

The SAF troopers used two brands of radio: the Harris Tactical Handheld Radio and the Motorola Ultra High Frequency transceivers. Only several units of the Harris radio were deployed to operators, and were used to relay information to the tactical and advanced command posts.

While the Harris radios worked, the Motorola units commonly used by policemen in urban areas constantly malfunctioned after being soaked in water. The batteries of those left functioning lasted for only several hours, the report said.

Such was the lack of communication among the SAF troopers battling it out with hundreds of armed men that they had to rely on gunfire to determine each other’s locations.

And as the operation unfolded, short-message service or text via cellular phones became the main mode of communication. But, said the BOI, texting “fell short of what were needed to relay real-time information and coordination of activities to and from the chain of command.”

It said that based on standard practice in conducting military operations “communications conducted through text messages do not connote urgency to respond or react.” The act of typing a text message alone indicates “that the sender has enough time to construct the message and wait for the recipient to reply at his available time,” said the report.

Yet there was Purisima sending a text message to Lt. Gen. Rustico Guerrero at around 7:57 a.m. of January 25, during what the BOI report said was the “crucial stage of the crisis: “Baka pwede artillery support sa AFP (Maybe the AFP can provide artillery support).”

Guerrero, also through texting, had earlier told Purisima that “tank and artillery support are made available” but were not yet necessarily deployed for the pinned down SAF troopers. Still, the BOI said, “Even if the response was ambiguous, (Purisima) failed to clarify its deployment by, for example, calling Guerrero.”

The report also mentioned that Napeñas tried texting Purisima several times to update him about the situation on the ground but because of poor network signal, some of his messages could not be sent.

Police Officer 3 Lloyd Tano Ensoy, one of the radio operators who bridged the communication between the 55th Special Action Company and the Tactical Command Post, also told the BOI that at around 1:00 p.m. of January 25, Napeñas himself heard Senior Insp. John Garry Erana shouting over the radio:”Mauubos na kami dito! (We are about to be all killed here!)”

That last message was followed by radio silence.

At around 1:26 p.m., said the report, Napeñas texted PNP Officer in Charge Leonardo Espina. Napeñas’s message was that the SAF had only wounded personnel. – PCIJ, March 2015